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Abstract
The paper discusses the use of positive and negative reasons when preferences about al-
ternative options have to be considered. Besides explaining the intuitive and formal situations
where such a bipolar reasoning is used, the paper shows how it is possible to generalise the
concordance/discordance principle in preference aggregation and applie it to the problem of
aggregating preferences expressed under intervals.
1 Introduction
Preference modelling, aggregation and exploitation constitute three main steps in elaborating an
evaluation model within a decision aiding process [Bouyssou et al., 2006]. In the preference mod-
elling step we are interested in ﬁnding a suitable way to translate “preference statements” (of the
type “I prefer x to y”), expressed by a decision maker, into formal statements enabling to establish
an evaluation model for decision support purposes. We then may need to aggregate such pref-
erence models in the case they represent several criteria or opinions. The result is then used in
the exploitation step where we try to establish a ﬁnal recommendation for a choice or a ranking
problem.
Preferences (about a set of objects) can be explicitly stated by the decision maker or implic-
itly obtained through other information (prices, evaluations, measures etc.). In both cases we
may face the situation where the information is expressed in a bipolar form which distinguishes
positive information from negative one: positive or negative assessments, positive or negative im-
pacts are typical examples. Moreover, the way by which preferences are manipulated may be
based on a bipolar reasoning, from voting procedures of large bodies1 to well known decision
support methods using the example/counter-example principle, the ideal/anti-ideal solution prin-
ciple or the concordance/discordance principle, etc. There can be different types of bipolarity
1see the Nice treaty about decision procedures in the new European Union bodies.
1([Dubois and Prade, 2006]) and a conjoint treatment of positive and negative information may not
ﬁt the decision situation and information at hand. We therefore, need speciﬁc procedures in such
cases.
In this paper we consider such bipolar information as positive and negative reasons supporting
or denying a possible preference statement. We are thus interested in the use of independent
positive and negative reasons where negative information is not the complement of the positive
one. Such reasons should account for the representation of bipolarity in the preference modelling,
aggregation and exploitation steps, while constructing an evaluation model.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy review the use of “bi-polar” scales
in value theory and deontic logic, some ﬁrst attempts to capture the possibility to use positive
and negative reasons when reasoning about values and preferences. Then in section 3, we present
several real world decision situations where the principle of considering positive and negative
reasons independently is current practice. In Section 4, we introduce our notation and set our
problem. In Section 5, we show how this can be handled generalising the concepts of concordance
and discordance. Section 6, is dedicated to an example of aggregating preferences expressed on
intervals where the use of positive and negative reasons is essential. We conclude showing further
research directions of this work.
2 Bipolarity in value theory: Historical discussion
In many ﬁelds, such as economics, social sciences, psychology, political science and decision
aiding, we need to represent values. Value theory, introduced in the sixties by ([Rescher, 1969]),
is one of the ﬁrst attempts to develop a general theory proposing an axiology and trying to establish
some relations between "evaluation" and "value". Questions in which value theory is interested
are such as: what is a value?, is it a property of an object (like its size)?, or is it a relationship
that arises out of circumstances linking the value object with the valuing subject in some special
way? The last question shows that there exists a connection between "value" and "preference"
since value may be determined as a result of a preference comparison.
Therealisationofavaluecanbesmallerorlargerinoneinstanceofitsapplicationascompared
with another. Rescher emphasises that "Evaluation" in the strictest sense is e-value-ation: a
comparative assessment or measurement of something with respect to its embodiment of a certain
2value and must be understood as the result of application of a valuation to certain items in a
speciﬁc case. He differentiates two types of value scales: bipolar and monopolar.
• Bipolar scale: A bipolar value scale covers the entire range between negative, neutral and
positive. The value and the corresponding disvalue are presented on the same scale as
opposite evaluations (example: ugly - indifferent - beautiful, disloyal - lukewarm - loyal).
• Monopolar scale: A monopolar value scale covers only half of range covered by bipolar
ones: neutral-positive. It does not permit to express a disvalue because of the lack of the
negative part, only the absence of something positive (like the wealth) can be expressed in
this covered spectrum (example: unimaginative - imaginative, unintelligent - intelligent). In
this case neutral point does not have a "neutral sense" since it represents a complete lack of
something positive.
Rescher points out that such a difference between scales may be necessary in order to differen-
tiate two notions: worth and value. The notion of value which is broader than the one of worth
requires the expressivity of disvalue while the one of worth does not admit the negative pole since
something having negative worth is not meaningful.
Another domain, related to value theory and preference, considering comparative evaluation of
items and covering some bipolarity, is "the logic of preference". Different researchers have been
interested in this subject; we undertake here the approach of Von Wright ([von Wright, 1963],
[von Wright, 1972]) who was the ﬁrst to introduce (to our knowledge) basic notions of such a
logic. Von Wright deﬁned ﬁve principles of a logic of preference which are related to the asym-
metry and transitivity of preference relation, the connection between preference and the change
of the state of affairs, the deﬁnition of preference between a disjunction of two objects and an-
other one and the holistic nature of preference. The central and most interesting principle of his
approach concerns the connection between change and preference. He deﬁnes the preference be-
tween two objects from four situations covering all the possibilities concerning their states: p ∧ q,
p ∧ ¬q, ¬p ∧ q and ¬p ∧ ¬q. Object p is preferred to object q if and only if the world with p ∧ ¬q
is preferred to the one with ¬p ∧ q as end-state of contemplated possible changes in his present
situation2. The indifference between two different objects is interpreted as in the following: under
2That means that a change from the second one to the ﬁrst one is preferable
3some circumstances the state (p∧¬q) is not preferred to the state (¬p∧q) and under some circum-
stances the state (¬p ∧ q) is not preferred to the state (p ∧ ¬q). It should be observed that the two
occurrences of "some" need not refer to the same circumstances. Indifference as deﬁned above is
not unconditional. As a consequence, the indifference of two states between themselves does not
entail that the two states have the same value relative to any other state: (pIq)∧(pPr) −→ (qPr)
is not a tautology (here P represents a strict preference and I an indifference).
Such an approach has some bipolar properties:
- Concerning indifference relation, two poles can be interpreted as: one pole related to the circum-
stances for an afﬁrmation and the other one against the same afﬁrmation.
- Concerning preference relation, we can see two poles: one pole related to the states of p and the
other related to the states of q.
To deﬁne the preference in such a way, it can be useful also to interpret some notions like good-
ness, badness or indifference:
A state p is good if it is unconditionally preferred to its negation ¬p.
A state p is bad if its negation ¬p is unconditionally preferred to it.
As it can be remarked, bipolarity has been interpreted since the sixties by researchers who are
interested in the representation of values and who proposed some tools (like bipolar scales) for
this purpose.
Bipolarity can be also found in real life decision problems. In the following section, we present
different decision problem situations (with a group of decision makers, one decision maker, with
multiple criteria or one criterion, with or without veto, etc.) where bipolarity can be found under
different aspects.
3 Bipolarity in intuitive decision making and in practice: Examples
Consider the very common situation where the faculty has to deliberate on the admission of can-
didates to a course (let’s say a management course). Then consider two candidates: the ﬁrst, x,
having quite good grades, systematically better than the second, y, but with a very bad grade in
management science; then candidate y, who is systematically worse than x, but has an excellent
grade in management science. Several faculty members will claim that, although candidate y is
4not better than candidate x, it is also difﬁcult to consider x better than y due to their inverse qual-
ity concerning the key class of the course, management science. The same faculty members will
also claim that the two candidates cannot be considered indifferent because they are completely
different. These members are intuitively adopting the same decision rule: candidate x is better
than candidate y iff (s)he has a majority of grades in (her)his favor and is not worse in a num-
ber of key classes. For an extensive discussion on the question of grades in decision support see
[Bouyssou et al., 2000].
If we consider a class grade of a candidate as (her)his value on a criterion, the reader will
observe that in the above decision rule there exist criteria having a “negative power”. Such a
“negative power” is not compensated by the “positive power” of the majority of criteria. It acts
independently and only in a negative sense.
Consider an individual, facing a comparison problem between two objects which are evaluated
by intervals. Suppose that the price of the ﬁrst one is between 100 and 130 and the one of the
second object is between 110 and 120. Which should (s)he prefer? Let’s suppose that we are
interested in the preference of the ﬁrst one over the second one. In this case, the difference between
100 and 110 has a “positive power” since in the left end points of intervals the ﬁrst one is cheaper,
but the difference between 130 and 120 occurs as “negative power” since this time the ﬁrst one is
more expensive. Positive and negative powers are independent and there can be cases where one
can not compensate the other.
Consider now a Parliament. The government has the support of the majority of seats, although
not a very strong one. Suppose now that a bill on a very sensitive issue (such as education, reli-
gion, national defence, minority rights etc.) is introduced for discussion by the government. Sev-
eral political, social and ethical issues are involved. Suppose ﬁnally that the opposition strongly
mobilises, considering that this bill is a major attack against “something”. Massive demonstra-
tions are organised, an aggressive media campaign is pursued etc.. It is quite reasonable that the
government will try to ﬁnd a compromise on some aspects of the bill in order to improve its “ac-
ceptability”. Note, however, that such a compromise concerns aspects argued by the minority and
not the majority.
Which decision rule is the government using to choose an appropriate law proposal in such
a situation? A law proposal x is considered “better” than y iff it meets the majority will and
5does not mobilises the minority aversion. It should be observed that the minority is considered
here as an independent decision power source. Such a “decision rule” is a regular practice in all
mature democracies. Although the minority does not have the power to impose its political will,
it has the possibility of expressing a “veto”, at least occasionally. Such a “negative power” may
not necessarily be codiﬁed somewhere, but is accepted. Actually, it is also a guarantee of the
democratic game. When the present majority becomes a minority it will be able to use the same
“negative power”.
Finally, consider the Security Council of the United Nations. Here, a number of nations are
ofﬁcially endowed with a veto power such that resolutions taken with a majority of votes (even the
highest ones) can be withdrawn if such a veto is used. We observe that in this case the decision
rule “x is better than y if it is the case for the majority and no veto is used against x” is ofﬁcially
adopted. Again we observe that the countries having a veto power do not have a “positive power”
(impose a decision), but only a “negative” one.
Within all the cited examples, there exist two different not compensated types of power, posi-
tive and negative ones, each one representing a different pole.
As it can be noted the use of independent positive and negative reasons within decision rules
is common practice for electoral bodies, commissions, boards, etc., besides being an intuitive rule
for comparing alternatives described under multiple attributes. It is therefore necessary to consider
a speciﬁc model to handle them.
4 Notation and Problem
InthefollowingAwillrepresentaﬁnite(countable)setofobjects(candidates, alternatives, actions
etc.) on which preferences are expressed and from which a choice or a ranking is expected to be
established.
We are going to note with  (possibly subscribed i) preference relations on the set A to be
read as “x is at least as good as y” (x  y or  (x,y)). We only impose reﬂexivity on such
a relation. If necessary we may add other speciﬁc properties.  will represent as usually the
asymmetric part of . We will also use capital letters P,Q,I ··· in order to represent speciﬁc
preference relations (characterised by their properties). As usual P−1 will represent the inverse
relation of P (P−1(x,y) ≡ P(y,x)).
6We are going to use + in order to represent preference sentences of the type “there are
positive reasons for considering x at least as good as y”, while − will represent sentences of the
type “there are negative reasons for which it should not be the case that x is at least as good as y”.
Both + and − are binary relations.
Given a set H of such preference relations (a set of criteria) and for each couple (x,y) ∈ A
we note as H+
xy the subset of H for which x + y holds (the coalition of criteria for which there
are positive reasons for which x is at least as good as y: positive coalition). In the same way we
are going to note as H−
xy the subset of H for which x − y holds (the coalition of criteria for
which there are negative reasons for which it should not be the case that x is at least as good as y:
negative coalition).
Our problem can be summarized in two steps.
1. Establish for each couple (x,y) ∈ A an overall preference relation (), possibly separating
it in + and −. This should correspond to a general rule to be applied recursively in
the case there is a hierarchy of criteria to take into account. We call this the preference
aggregation step.
2. Given such an overall preference relation, establish a ﬁnal recommendation under form of
a choice or a ranking on the set A, whenever this is required. We call this the preference
exploitation step.
The reader can see an extensive discussion about the above two steps in classic Multiple Cri-
teria Decision Analysis in [Bouyssou et al., 2006].
5 Generalizing Concordance and Discordance
5.1 Preference Aggregation
We introduce the general rule
x + y ⇐⇒ P+(H+
xy) ≥ γ (1)
x − y ⇐⇒ P−(H−
xy) ≥ δ (2)
7where P+ (P−) represents a measure of the importance of the “positive” (respectively negative)
coalition and γ and δ represent two thresholds.
We are not going to discuss in this paper how P+ (P−) is established, but without loss of gen-
erality we can assume that is a real valued function to the interval [0,1]. Of course the thresholds
γ and δ are deﬁned within the same interval.
The ﬁrst rule should be read as: when comparing x to y under all criteria, there are sufﬁcient
positive reasons to claim that x is at least as good as y iff the coalition of criteria where it is the
case that x is at least as good as y is sufﬁciently strong.
The second rule should be read as: when comparing x to y under all criteria, there are sufﬁ-
cient negative reasons to claim that it is not the case that x is at least as good as y iff the coalition
of criteria where it is not the case that x is at least as good as y is sufﬁciently strong.
In principle P+ and P− are independently evaluated and therefore the strength of the positive
and negative coalitions are not computed in the same way nor can be considered one the comple-
ment of the other. If we interpret the above rule within a social choice setting, we can consider P+
as the strength of the majority coalition, the γ threshold being the majority required to approve
a bill, while P− should be considered as the minority strength, the δ threshold representing the
situation where a veto could be expressed. Consider again the United Nations Security Council
example. Positive power is for each member is 1/15. The strength of the positive coalition is
computed additively, the γ threshold being 3/5. The negative power of each member is 0 or 1
(depending on their status: permanent, not permanent). The strength of the negative coalition is
computed using the max operator, the δ threshold being 1.
The idea of using P+ and P− has been already introduced in Multiple Criteria Decision Mak-
ing methods. In the so called “outranking methods”, the global preference relation S (to be read
as “at least as good as”) is generally established as
S(x,y) ⇐⇒ C(x,y) ∧ ¬D(x,y) (3)
where C(x,y) is the concordance test (is there a weighted majority of criteria in favor of x wrt to
y?) and D(x,y) is the discordance test (is there a veto against x wrt to y?).
Example 1. A typical application of the above rule can be seen in one of the oldest ”outranking
8methods” (see [Roy, 1968]) where:
C(x,y) ⇐⇒
P
j∈Jxy wj
P
j wj
≥ γ, (4)
D(x,y) ⇐⇒ ∃j : gj(y) − gj(x) > vj (5)
where:
• gj is a real valued function representing the evaluation of alternatives with respect to the
criterion cj (to be maximised);
• wj is a non negative coefﬁcient which represents the importance of the criterion cj;
• Jxy represents the set of criteria for which x is at least as good as y; more precisely, Jxy =
{j : gj(y) − gj(x) ≤ qj} where qj is the indifference threshold associated to criterion cj;
therefore, Jxy = H+
xy;
• γ is a majority threshold;
• vj is a veto threshold on criterion cj;
• consequently H−
xy will be the set of criteria where a veto is expressed against S(x,y).
In this case a sufﬁciently strong positive coalition is any subset of criteria for which the sum of
the importance coefﬁcients is at least γ. If such a coalition exists, it means that we have positive
reasons to consider that x is at least as good as y. On the other hand, we have negative reasons
to consider that x is at least as good as y when y is largely better than x on at least one criterion.
However, this way to interpret the concordance/discordance principle presents a number of
weak points. Using the deﬁnition in equation (3), both the concordance and the non-discordance
tests have to be veriﬁed in order to establish the outranking relation. Indeed, the negative reasons
(discordance) are sufﬁcient to invalid the positive ones (concordance). However, there is a big
semantic difference between a situation where a majority of criteria supports that “x is at least as
good as y”, but there is a veto, a situation where there is neither majority nor veto and a situation
where there is a minority of criteria in favour of the outranking relation. In other words, when
comparing two alternatives x and y, the use of the concordance/discordance principle introduces
9four different epistemic situations but only two possible cases can occur (either the outranking
relation holds or not).
Moreover, the principle does not work recursively. There is no way to consider the existence
of positive and negative reasons for each single criterion which should be aggregated separately.
This prevents the use of this method in a hierarchical structure of criteria and agents.
Remark 1. The two functions P+ and P− are supposed to be measures of the strength of the
positive and negative coalition of criteria respectively. It is reasonable to consider such func-
tions as “fuzzy measures” or “valued binary relations” instead of using their “cuts” repre-
sented by the thresholds γ and δ. This is the approach adopted by several authors including
[Figueira and Greco, 2004], [Grabisch and Labreuche, 2005], [Fernandez and Olmedo, 2005]or
[Öztürk and Tsoukiàs, 2006]. The result will be a “bi-polar” (positive/negative) measure of the
strength of preference for each pair of objects in A.
5.2 Preference Exploitation
Aggregating preferences will generally result in a binary relation which is neither necessarily
complete nor transitive (see [Bouyssou, 1996], [Vincke, 1982]). The global relations + and
− obtained after aggregating preferences are not necessarily orders. Thus, is difﬁcult, if not
impossible, to identify a best choice or a ranking of the set A, just using these relations. In order
to obtain such a result (which we may call a ﬁnal recommendation) it is necessary to further
elaborate the information obtained from the aggregation step.
The literature offers a large variety of procedures for this purpose when conventional pref-
erence structures are considered (see for instance [Vincke, 1992]). The interested reader can see
more details in [Bouyssou et al., 2006], chapter 7. However, very few, if any, procedures exist
when positive and negative procedures are considered separately (see [Greco et al., 1998]). In this
paper we present two procedures:
- the positive/negative net ﬂow procedure;
- the positive/negative dominance ranking procedure.
Let us recall that the input of such procedures are the two binary relations + and − on the set
A and the output is a ranking of the set A.
1. The positive/negative net ﬂow. For each element x ∈ A we compute a score
10σ(x) = |{y ∈ A : x + y}| + |{y ∈ A : y − x}| (6)
−|{y ∈ A : y + x}| − |{y ∈ A : x − y}|
We then rank the set A by decreasing values of σ. In other terms, for each element x we
count the elements for which there are positive reasons such that x should be at least as good
as them plus the elements for which there are negative reasons for which they should not be
at least as good as x and we subtract the number of elements for which there are positive
reasons for which they should be at least as good as x and the elements for which there
are negative reasons for which x should not be at least as good as them. This procedure
generalizes the net ﬂow procedure used in MCDM (see [Bouyssou, 1992]).
2. The positive/negative dominance ranking. The procedure establishes two distinct rankings,
one for the positive and one for the negative reasons and works as follows:
- consider the graph associated to the relation +;
- identify the subset A+
1 of A such that there are no entering arcs to any of its elements (the
elements of A for which there are no other elements having positive reasons for which they
should be at least as good as them);
- establish A+
1 as an equivalence class (the best), eliminate it from A and apply the same
procedure to A \ A+
1 ; this will identify the second best equivalence class A+
2 ;
- proceed until the set A is totally ranked from A+
1 (the best) to A+
n (the least best);
- consider the graph associated to the relation −;
- identify the subset A−
1 of A such that there are no entering arcs to any of its elements (the
elements of A for which there are no other elements having negative reasons for which they
should not be at least as good as them);
- establish A−
1 as an equivalence class (the worst), eliminate it from A and apply the same
procedure to A \ A−
1 ; this will identify the second worst equivalence class A−
2 ;
- proceed until the set A is totally ranked from A−
n (the least worst) to A−
1 (the worst);
- the two rankings do not necessarily coincide. A partial ranking of A can be obtained from
the intersection of these two rankings.
Several other procedures can be conceived. We limit ourselves in this paper to these two
11examples just in order to show how it is possible to obtain a ﬁnal ranking after preferences have
been aggregated using positive and negative reasons independently. Concluding this section we
can make the following remarks.
Remark 2. In the case P+ and P− are considered as fuzzy measures the preference exploitation
step will require different procedures. For examples see [Öztürk and Tsoukiàs, 2006].
Remark 3. The idea of ﬁnal recommendation adopted in this paper focusses on obtaining a choice
or a ranking for the set A. However, in real decision support situations a ﬁnal recommendation
can be richer than that. For instance it can identify conﬂicts and incomparabilities to analyze
before any further decision. A clear representation of the positive and negative reasons behind
such critical issues is extremely beneﬁcial in such situations.
In the following we are going to show how the above ideas apply to a speciﬁc preference
aggregation problem: the case where preferences are expressed through comparison of intervals.
6 Aggregating preferences on Intervals
Consider a set of four objects A = {a,b,c,d} and a set of four criteria H = {h1,h2,h3,h4}. In
order to simplify the presentation we consider that to all four criteria correspond attributes where
the objects in A can take numerical values on a scale from 1 to 8. However, in this particular case
we make the hypothesis that due to uncertainties on the real values of the objects these will take
a value under form of an interval. Figure 1 shows how the objects in A are evaluated on the four
attributes.
Where is the problem? Conventionally, comparison of intervals is based on the hypothesis
that “x is preferred to y”, P(x,y), iff the lowest value of x is larger than the greatest value of y
(the intervals thus being disjoint). In all other cases “x is indifferent to y” (I(x,y)) (for more on
interval orders see [Fishburn, 1985], [Pirlot and Vincke, 1997], [Trotter, 1992]). If we interpret as
usual the binary relation  as P ∪ I then the graphs representing this binary relation for the four
criteria can be seen in table 1 (here represented under form of a 0-1 matrix).
Aggregating these preferences with a simple majority rule: “x is at least as good as y iff it
is the case for at least three out of four criteria”, will return all four objects indifferent. This is
121 7 d
2 4 c
3 6 b
5 8 a
h4
2 4 d
3 6 c
1 7 b
5 8 a
h3
2 3 d
1 6 c
5 7 b
4 8 a
h2
6 8 d
1 3 c
4 7 b
2 5 a
h1
Figure 1: The values of A on the four attributes
not surprising, since conventional interval orders only use positive information and are unable to
differentiate between sure indifference and hesitation between indifference and preference.
In order to overcome this problem we are going to introduce positive and negative reasons both
in comparing objects at each criterion level as well as at the aggregated one. For this purpose we
are going to use a preference structure called PQI-interval order ([Tsoukiàs and Vincke, 2003]).
In this structure we consider three possibilities when comparing intervals:
- strict preference (P): when an interval is completely to the right of the other (exactly as in
13h1 a b c d
a 1 1 1 0
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 0 1 0
d 1 1 1 1
h2 a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 1 1 1
d 0 0 1 1
h3 a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 1 1 1
d 0 1 1 1
h4 a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 0 1 1 1
d 1 1 1 1
Table 1: The four Interval Orders
conventional interval orders);
- indifference (I): when one interval is completely included in the other;
- hesitation between preference and indifference or weak preference (Q): when an interval is to
the right to the other, but they have a non empty intersection.
Applying this structure to the information previously presented we obtain the preference relations
in table 2.
We are now going to interpret such preference relations in terms of positive and negative
reasons. For this purpose we are going to use the + and − relations and deﬁne:
P(x,y) ⇐⇒ + (x,y)∧ 6− (x,y)∧ 6+ (y,x)∧ − (y,x) (7)
I(x,y) ⇐⇒ + (x,y)∧ 6− (x,y)∧ + (y,x)∧ 6− (y,x) (8)
Q(x,y) ⇐⇒ + (x,y)∧ 6− (x,y)∧ + (y,x)∧ − (y,x) (9)
In other words, while P and I represent “sure” situations of interval comparison, the rela-
tion Q represents an hesitation between them: indeed when comparing x to y we have positive
reasons claiming that x is at least as good as y and no negative reasons claiming the opposite;
when comparing y to x we have both positive and negative reasons (due to the fact that the
larger value of y is larger than the smaller value of x, but smaller than the larger value of x).
14h1 a b c d
a I Q−1 Q P−1
b Q I P Q−1
c Q−1 P−1 I P−1
d P Q P I
h2 a b c d
a I I Q P
b I I Q P
c Q−1 Q−1 I I
d P−1 P−1 I I
h3 a b c d
a I Q Q P
b Q−1 I I I
c Q−1 I I Q
d P−1 I Q−1 I
h4 a b c d
a I Q P Q
b Q−1 I Q I
c P−1 Q−1 I I
d Q−1 I I I
Table 2: The four PQI interval orders
For further details on such models the reader can see [Öztürk , 2005], [Tsoukiàs et al., 2002] and
[Tsoukiàs and Vincke, 1998]. Applying this reasoning to the information concerning the set A we
get the results in table 3 (for the positive reasons) and in table 4 (for the negative reasons).
In order to aggregate these positive and negative reasons let us apply now the principle intro-
duced in equations 1-2. In this precise case we use the following speciﬁc rule:
x + y ⇐⇒
|{hj : x +
j y}|
|H|
≥
3
4
(10)
x − y ⇐⇒
|{hj : x −
j y}|
|H|
≥
1
2
(11)
Actually we use a very simple aggregation rule. Both P+ and P− are additive and for both
the positive and negative distribution of power we consider the criteria equivalent. The results of
this aggregation can be seen in table 5.
What do we get from these results?
First of all we are able to reconstruct a PQI preference structure at the aggregated level. We
can establish the type of preference relation holding for any pair of objects in the set A. More
precisely, applying equations 7-9 we get the results shown in table 6.
We can now check whether such a PQI preference structure is also a PQI interval order
15+
1 a b c d
a 1 1 1 0
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 0 1 0
d 1 1 1 1
+
2 a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 1 1 1
d 0 0 1 1
+
3 a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 1 1 1
d 0 1 1 1
+
4 a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 0 1 1 1
d 1 1 1 1
Table 3: Positive Reasons
−
1 a b c d
a 0 1 0 1
b 0 0 0 1
c 1 1 0 1
d 0 0 0 0
−
2 a b c d
a 0 0 0 0
b 0 0 0 0
c 1 1 0 0
d 1 1 0 0
−
3 a b c d
a 0 0 0 0
b 1 0 0 0
c 1 0 0 0
d 1 0 1 0
−
4 a b c d
a 0 0 0 0
b 1 0 0 0
c 1 1 0 0
d 1 0 0 0
Table 4: Negative Reasons
16+ a b c d
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 1 1 1
d 0 1 1 1
− a b c d
a 0 0 0 0
b 1 0 0 0
c 1 1 0 0
d 1 0 0 0
Table 5: Positive and Negative Reasons after Aggregation
PQI a b c d
a I Q Q P
b Q−1 I Q I
c Q−1 Q−1 I I
d P−1 I I I
Table 6: The PQI preference structure after aggregation
and if it is the case we can try to reconstruct a numerical representation for each element of
A under form of interval. Using results known in the literature ([Ngo The and Tsoukias, 2005],
[Ngo The et al., 2000]) we can prove that in this precise case this is indeed a PQI interval order,
a numerical representation of which can be seen in ﬁgure 2.
3 4 d
1 6 c
2 7 b
5 8 a
Figure 2: The global PQI interval order
In the case we deﬁnitely need a more operational result such as a ranking we can use any of
the procedures introduced in section 4.2. More precisely adopting the positive/negative net ﬂow
procedure (see equation 7) we get a > b > d > c (> representing the ranking relation). If we use
the positive/negative dominance ranking we obtain a different result: a > b > d,c. This is not
17surprising, if we consider the nature of the aggregation procedure and the information available.
Concluding this section we may make the following remarks.
Remark 4. To our knowledge this is the only way through which is possible to aggregate pref-
erences expressed on intervals without ending with only indifference, losing precious information
(see [Pirlot and Vincke, 1992]). The identiﬁcation of positive and negative reasons in intervals
comparison allows to exploit information which in conventional preference modelling is usually
neglected. The speciﬁc suggestions done in this paper should be considered as examples, since
several other possibilities can be considered depending on the problem on hand.
Remark 5. The reader can check that modifying the parameters and rules in the aggregation and
exploitation steps one can obtain signiﬁcantly different results. This is not surprising since these
are not preferential information obtained from the decision maker and are more or less arbitrary.
Care should be taken to tune them robustly.
Remark 6. Fortunately the algorithmic part of the above procedures is “easy”. Indeed as shown
in [Ngo The and Tsoukias, 2005] and [Ngo The et al., 2000], checking if a PQI preference struc-
ture is a PQI interval order and ﬁnding a numerical representation are all problems in P.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we focus on the advantages of using independent positive and negative reasons in
preference aggregation. More precisely:
• aggregating independent positive and negative reasons allows to clearly distinguish situa-
tions of sure preference from situations of hesitation as well as between incomparabilities
due to conﬂicts (presence of both positive and negative reasons) and incomparabilities due
to ignorance (absence of both positive and negative reasons);
• modelling independently positive and negative reasons allows to use the same principle for
any level of preference modelling (single criterion, single agent, multiple criteria, multiple
agents and their combinations), thus generalising the concordance/discordance principle;
18• the use of positive and negative reasons when objects evaluated on intervals are compared
allows to solve the problem of aggregating such preferences, a situation encountered not
only in decision aiding, but in several other ﬁelds (see [Öztürk et al., 2005]).
Several research problems remain open in the paper. Among these we note the following:
- axiomatise preference aggregation and exploitation procedures based on the independent use of
positive and negative reasons (of the type presented in this paper);
- study appropriate formalisms (multiple valued logics, argumentation theory etc.) enabling ele-
gant and compact representations besides further extending the potentialities of this approach;
- further investigate the problem of aggregating PQI preference structures: under what conditions
the aggregation of such preference structures will result in a PQI interval order or any other order
representable by intervals?
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